The U.S. NRC began the process of certwng advanced nuclear power plants in the early 1990's. The design certification process requires an applicant to comply with technically relevant portions of the regulations established as a result of Three Mile Island. Included as a requirement is to provide a control room design that reflects state-of-the-art human factors building the human system i plant locations such as the ote shutdown facility. To address this ent, the NRC developed a Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model Boveri-Combu designer has provided a different approach to developing the HSIs for their plants which has presented the NRC with a unique challenge.
Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants"), governs the process for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's review of advanced plant designs. 10 CFR Part 52 encourages standardization and streamlining the licensing process.
To date, the Commission has evaluated for certification designs from two applicants for light water reactors, the Advanced Boiling
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U S GOVERNMENT WORK NOT PROTECTED BY US. COPYRIGHT Water Reactor (ABWR) from General Electric Corporation (GE) and the system $0+ from ASEA Brown BoveriCombustion Engineering (ABB-CE). The NRC is presently reviewing a third light water reactor design, the AP600, from Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC).
The designs submitted by GE and ABB-CE are known as "evolutionary" designs becau are based upon improvements to conventional light water reactor designs. The WEC AP600 design is known as a "passive" design because it takes advantage of natural, "passive" forces such as gravity, natural circulation, and compressed gas to make its safety systems work. 10 
CFR Part 52 Design Review and Certification Process
Obtaining a standard design certification under 10 CFR Part 52 requires the applicant for certification (e.g.,designer) to submit a Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) for review and approval by the NRC. The NRC's review of the SSAR is issued as a Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER). Based on the FSER, the Commission will issue a final design approval (FDA) for the design. The Commission then makes a rule certifying the design to provide final resolution of design issues that were evaluated, making them no longer subject to litigation.
The rule certlfying a design will contain a suffncient level of detail so that it provides for a standardized design and provides for early resolution of design issues while allowing for the flexibility to accommodate necessary changes to a facility, such as site-specific details, during its construction and operation lifetime. The rule only certifies a selected portion of the 6-1 8 information submitted by the designer. This information is &erred to as "Tier 1" information. This portion of the design information will be verified by the NRC and can only be changed by rulemaking.
The remainder of the design information, typically that contained in the SSAR, is less stringently controlled, with some potentially requiring NRC review and approval before changes can be made. The certified design then can be referenced by an applicant for a combined operating license (COL) which will allow the applicant to both build and operate the plant ("one step" licensing). In contrast, plants m n t l y operating were licensed under a "twostep" process, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities".
Human Factors EnJzineerine Review
10 CFR Part 52 states that an applicant may seek a standard design certification for an "essentially complete nuclear power plant design...". 10 CFR Part 52 also stipulates that an application for design certification must comply with the "technically relevant portions" of the Three Mile Island requirements that are contained in 10 CFR 50.34(f). It is this rule that establishes human factors engineering as a significant requirement that must be addressed by applicants for design certification.
Though 10 CFR Part 52 indicates that design certification may be sought for "an essentially complete design", in practice the designs that have been submitted for review have not been complete, especially with regard to human factors considerations. This is because of, in large part, the changing human-system interface technology which makes it difficult for applicants to submit a completed design for an advanced plant which may be years away from construction.
It has been an equally difficult challenge for the NRC to review these incomplete designs. To address this challenge, the NRC has been performing reviews of applicant's human factors engineering design process rather than the final product of their HFE design, which was what was done during the post-TMI detailed control
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room design reviews of the 1980's conducted by the NRC.
To aid the NRC in reviewing less than complete designs, a unique evaluation tool has emerged from the early stages of reviewing advanced reactor designs. Called Inspections, Tests, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC), this concept assists the staff in making its safety findings before plant construction begins. ITAAC allow the staff to confirm that the facility will be built in accordance with the design More the actual operation of the plant.
ITAAC consist of various inspections, tests, and analyses which the COL performs for significant aspects of their facility, measuring the results against certain acceptance criteria. For example, if the manual actuation of a pump has particular safety sigtllficance for the design, the COL can perform various inspections, tests or analyses and compare the results to the acceptance criteria to verify the operator's ability to operate the pump. It is through ITAAC that the NRC can confirm, before fuel loading, that the plant was built and will operate according to the approved design.
As the principal guidance for performing its human factors engineering reviews, the NRC 
NUREG-07 1 1 is an evaluation methodology
based on a design and implementation process. The methodology includes ten essential elements for designing and implementing a human factors engineering program for advanced nuclear power plants (Fig. 1) . "FEG-0711 contains review criteria for the NRC to use in the programmatic review of HSIs for advanced reactor designs. The review model was developed in a generic form allowing it to be applied or "tailored" to address the specific needs of the review being per€ormed.
6-1 9
---insert fig, 1 here ---
The "flexibility" of NUREG-07 1 1 has made it easier for the staff to accommodate the different degrees of design detail for HFE programs that have been submitted for certification to date. The overall purpose of NUREG-07 1 1 is to ensure that: (1) the HFE has been integrated into the plant development and design; (2) the HSI's, procedures, and training reflect state-of-the-art human factors principles and satisfy all other appropriate regulatory requirements; and (3) the HSI's, procedures, and training promote safe efficient, and reliable performance maintenance, test, inspection, and surveillance tasks.
Also included as part of the NRCs review criteria, though not part of NUREG-07 1 1, is concept known as Minimum Inventory of Controls, Displays, and Alarms or simply, "Minimum Inventory". This concept was developed to ensure that an advanced reactor control room would consist of, at a minimum, key displays, controls, and alarms necessary to carry out operator actions associated with perfonning emergency operating procedures and those risk important operator actions that were identified from Probabilistic Risk AssessmentMuman Reliability Assessment (P )analyses.
Human Factors Engineering Review Exuenence
Each of the three advanced reactor desi reviews performed by the sta.8 has been different. In the early 199O's, the 
GE ABWR Review
GE submitted a "design and implementation process plan" for certification, together with ITAAC. The first part of the plan presented GE's plant and system design elements; the second part described the elements th cked a high level of detail. Ultimately, the lack of detail resulted in all elements of the program being developed into ITAAC; that is the entire program must be completed by the future licensee. What is to be certified for GE (the "designer") is the human factors engineering "design process"; no results or products of the application of the HFE design process are being certified for the 6 ABB-CE, unlike GE, completed the first three elements of Fig. 1 as part of their submittal for design certification. ABB-CE provided the NRC with a formal human factors engineering program to guide HFE activities, detailed operating experience review which took into consideration a substantial amount of pertinent commercial nuclear power plant experience, and a satisfactory functional requirements analysis and allocation. They also submitted detailed methodologies for the COL to use in completing Elements 5 and 7 and a less detailed plan for developing a verificationhalidation (Element 10) methodology. As with GE, procedures was identified as a COL responsibility for ABB-CE. Like GE, ABB-CE developed technical bases (Emergency Operations Guidelines) to support the development of plant-specific emergency operating procedures. ABB-CE also submitted a Minimum Inventory for the main control room and remote shutdown facility and ITAAC for those programmatic elements that were not completed by ABB-CE for design certification. In addition, ABB-CE submitted a partial design of the main control room for NRC evaluation. 
ABWR.
To address the specific aspects of the ABB-CE HFE submittal, in addition to the conducting a review of GE's proposed human factors engineering design process, the NRC performed a "design features review" to evaluate important elements of the System 80+ main control room (also designated as "NUPLEX 80+"). The review focused on evaluating seven design features of the NUPLEX 80+, including a large wall panel overview screen (IPSO).
The objective of the design features review was to determine the acceptability of the basic design features of the System 80+ advanced control room with regard to consistency with established human factors engineering standards, guidelines, and principles. The control room design was also reviewed against Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 requirements for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The staff relied on guidance such as NUREG-0700, "Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews"; NUREG/CR-5908 , "Advanced Humadsystem Interface Design Review Guideline"; and NUREG/CR-6105 , "Compilation of Alarm System Guidelines and Evaluation of Their Applicability to Hybrid and Advanced Control Rooms", to conduct the design features review.
The ABB-CE main control room mockup was used in the review. The mockup consisted of selected panels of the master control console in a static representation as well as portions of the reactor coolant system and chemical and volume control system panels in a dynamic simulated mockup. The IPSO was represented by a rear projection display device. In August, 1994, the NRC issued their Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) for the ABB-CE System 80+ after determining that all open issues identified from the DSER design process review and the design features review were satisfactori ABB-CE. At the time this paper was written, the NRC was nearing publication of the final rule for the System 80+.
WEC AP600 Review
The staff is currently completi factors engineering review for the WEC AP600 passive reactor design. As mentioned previously, the WEC submittal has posed yet a third set of circumstances for the staff to address in preparing their safety evaluation. As with the previous two reviews, the staff approached evaluating the AP600 S S A R in two phases, WEC also used a different approach to assess operator behavior in a nuclear power plant. It is the author's opinion that GE and ABB-CE take a more "traditional" approach in assessing the operators' behavior than does WEC. For example, GE and ABB-CE propose using "traditional" task analysis methods to detemne required operator behaviors. WEC, however, has proposed to determine required AP600 operator behaviors based more on "cognitive systems engineering theory". Specifically, WEC has based their design process on the mental models of Jens Rasmussen. Their approach requires a decomposition of plant equipment purposes to form a structure that is used for information to control rwm operators. WEC acknowledges, to a greater degree than the other two designers, the potential effects of cognitive influences on the performance of the AP600 operator. "A competent operator is defined as one who is mentally ahead of the processes that he controls. Ideally, for this operator, their are no surprises"' . WC has, for example, a behaviorally-based task analysis and a cognitively-based task analysis, the latter emphasizing the decision-making tasks required by the operator. WEC has also chosen, unlike GE and ABB-CE, to propose the use computerized procedures as the primary medium for presenting emergency operating procedures. The actual development of plant procedures for the AP600 design remains the responsibility of the COL as with GE and ABB-CE. Of the three advanced control room designs submitted for certification, the AP600 design also makes the greatest use of compact operator workstations.
At the time this paper was written, the AP600 review was still in progress, WEC was refining their human factors engineering ITAAC for submittal to the NRC and the staff was preparing their Final Safety Evaluation Report. As discussed, each of the three designers of advanced plants have submitted to the NRC human factors engineering programs for design certification that have significant differences from each other. All the submittals, however, are alike in that none represented completed designs of the required HSI's for their advanced plant. To meet the challenge presented by individual designers, the NRC has been using NUREG-0711, the Human Factors Engineering FVogram Review Model, together with the concept of ITAAC for ensuring that the as-built advanced designs will result in acceptable human systems interfaces. Despite the differences presented to the NRC by the three advanced designs submitted for certification, the review process contained in NUREG-07 1 
